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Abstract—Increasingly large trip demands have strained ur-
ban transportation capacity, which consequently leads to traffic
congestion. In this work, we focus on mitigating traffic congestion
by incentivizing passengers to switch from private to public
transit services. We address the following challenges. First,
the passengers incur inconvenience costs when participating in
traffic offload due to delay and discomfort, and thus need to
be reimbursed. The inconvenience cost, however, is unknown
to the government when choosing the incentives. Furthermore,
participating in traffic offload raises privacy concerns from
passengers. An adversary could infer personal information, (e.g.,
daily routine, region of interest, and wealth), by observing the
decisions made by the government, which are known to the
public. We adopt the concept of differential privacy and propose
privacy-preserving incentive designs under two settings, denoted
as two-way communication and one-way communication. Under
two-way communication, we focus on how the government should
reveal passengers’ inconvenience costs to properly incentivize
them while preserving differential privacy. We formulate the
problem as a mixed integer linear program, and propose a
polynomial-time approximation algorithm. We show the proposed
approach achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, social opti-
mality, and differential privacy. Under one-way communication,
we focus on how the government should design the incentives
without revealing passengers’ inconvenience costs while still
preserving differential privacy. We formulate the problem as
a convex program, and propose a differentially private and
near-optimal solution algorithm. A numerical case study using
Caltrans Performance Measurement System (PeMS) data source
is presented as evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The trip demands of the increasing urban population have
created a shortage in transportation capacity due to relatively
slower development of transportation infrastructure [1]. Sev-
eral strategies have been proposed to overcome this challenge
[2]. A straightforward approach is to increase the capac-
ity of transportation infrastructure by adding more lanes to
existing highways and creating new highways in identified
congestion areas. However, this approach is expensive and
time consuming. Other than physically changing the existing
transportation infrastructures, operational improvements aim at
utilizing existing transportation infrastructures in a more effi-
cient way. Transportation management centers (TMC) [2], [3]
improve highway operations by ramp metering [4], managing
traffic flow when incidents happen [5], and reporting real-time
information about weather and route conditions [6]. The last
category focuses on demand side management. The intuition
of the approaches belonging to this category is to serve more
passengers using less vehicles so that the congestion can
be mitigated. Typical strategies include ridesharing [7], [8],
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alternative travel options (e.g., bicycle/pedestrian) [9], and
pricing scheme design [10]–[12].
In this work, we focus on demand side management. In
particular, we investigate how to incentivize passengers to
switch from private transit service (PVTS) to public transit
service (PBTS). Before analyzing how to incentivize the
passengers, we first characterize PVTS (e.g., taxis and ride-
hailing service) and PBTS (e.g., buses and subways). PVTS
provides passengers high quality of service (QoS) with few
or no stop, and high flexibility in terms of route selection
and travel time. However, PVTS normally charges high fares.
PBTS provides a group of passengers a shared ride following a
fixed route and schedule time table. Although PBTS sacrifices
QoS, passengers incur less fares.
By the nature of PVTS and PBTS, we observe that if
more passengers are willing to switch from PVTS to PBTS
to satisfy their trip demands, the number of operating vehicles
decreases and therefore congestion can be mitigated. However,
there are several difficulties to incentivize passengers to switch
from PVTS to PBTS. First, passengers incur inconvenience
costs while changing their transit behavior by switching from
PVTS to PBTS. The inconvenience cost is due to several
factors including reduced QoS and delay of arrival time.
Thus the passengers need to be reimbursed. Moreover, the
inconvenience cost, which varies from passenger to passenger
depending on the preference of each passenger, is unknown to
the government and the passengers are not willing to reveal
their inconvenience cost functions since the inconvenience
cost functions contain personal information such as region
of interest and daily routine. Finally, the passengers have
privacy concerns when participating in traffic offload. A pri-
vacy sensitive passenger might lie on its inconvenience cost
when revealing it due to privacy concerns to achieve privacy
guarantees at the expense of sub-optimal utility. Therefore,
the government needs to design a mechanism which not only
incentivizes the passengers to switch from PVTS to PBTS, but
also addresses their privacy concerns.
In this paper, we focus on the mechanism design to incen-
tivize the passengers to switch from PVTS to PBTS. We make
the following contributions.
• We formulate the problem of mechanism design to in-
centivize passengers to switch from PVST to PBST
under two settings, including two-way communication
between the government and passengers and one-way
communication from the government to the passengers.
We present an adversary model under each setting that
characterizes passengers’ privacy concerns.
• We model the interaction between the government and
passenger under two-way communication using a reverse
auction model. We formulate the problem as a mixed
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integer linear program. We propose an efficient approxi-
mation algorithm to reduce the computation complexity.
• We prove that the proposed mechanism design under
two-way communication achieves approximate optimal
social welfare, truthfulness, individual rationality, and
differential privacy.
• For the one-way communication, we formulate the prob-
lem as an online convex program. We give a polynomial-
time algorithm to solve for the mechanism design. We
prove that the proposed mechanism is differentially pri-
vate and Hannan consistent.
• We present a numerical case study with real-world trace
data as evaluation. The results show that the proposed
approach achieves individual rationality and non-negative
social welfare, and is privacy preserving.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
discuss the related works in Section II. In Section III, we
present the problem formulation under two-way and one-way
communication settings, respectively. We present the proposed
incentive mechanism design in Section IV for the two-way
communication setting. Section V gives the proposed solution
for one-way communication setting. The proposed approaches
are demonstrated using a numerical case study in Section VI.
We conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present literature review on intelligent
transportation system and differential privacy. Significant re-
search effort has been devoted to achieving intelligent and
sustainable transportation system. Planning and routing navi-
gation problems have been investigated by transportation and
control communities [13]–[18]. These works focus on finding
the optimal path for each vehicle, and are not sufficient to ad-
dress the imbalance between trip demands and transportation
capacity. Various approaches have been proposed to improve
operation efficiency of existing transportation infrastructure,
among which vehicle balancing [19] has been extensively
studied for bike sharing [20] and taxis [21]. Metering strategy
has also been investigated [4]. Different from works mentioned
above, this paper focuses on the demand side management.
In the following, we discuss related works on demand side
management. Alternative travel facilities have been imple-
mented all over the world, e.g., bike sharing system [22].
Moreover, ridesharing system and the associated ridesharing
match system has been investigated [23], [24], which grouped
passengers with similar itineraries and time schedules together
to reduce the number of operating vehicles. Most of these
works focus on taxis and ride-hailing services such as Uber
and Lyft, and ignore the potential from PBTS. Pricing schemes
have been proposed to reduce the number of operating vehicles
at peak hour [10]–[12]. These works focus on private cars
and ignore the PBTS. This paper fills the gap in existing
literature by considering the switch from PVTS to PBTS.
Researchers have identified the factors that prevent passengers
from PBTS [25], [26]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
it has received little research attention on how to incentivize
passengers to switch from private to public transit services.
Mechanism design has recently been used in engineering
applications such as cloud computing. In particular, Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [27] is widely used to
preserve truthfulness. However, truthful communication raises
the privacy concerns. To address the privacy issue, we adopt
the concept of differential privacy [28]–[30]. Mechanism de-
sign with differential privacy, such as exponential mechanism,
has been proposed [30]–[33]. However, they are not readily
applicable to the problem investigated in this paper because the
presence of inconvenience cost functions leads to violation on
individual rationality. Moreover, the computation complexity
in exponential mechanism is addressed in this paper.
Trial-and-error implementation for toll pricing has been
proposed in [34]. Different from [34], we consider a closed-
loop Stackelberg information pattern, and compute the optimal
incentive price. To solve the problem under one-way commu-
nication setting, we adopt the Laplace mechanism to preserve
differential privacy [30]. This paper extends our preliminary
conference version [35], in which two-way communication
setting is studied. We extend the preliminary work by investi-
gating the one-way communication setting.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first give the problem overview. Then we
present the problem formulations under two settings, denoted
as two-way communication and one-way communication. We
finally discuss the privacy model.
A. Problem Overview
Let S = {1, · · · , S} denote the set of origin-destination
(OD) pairs that will require traffic offload in the near future
time horizon t = 1, · · · , T , with each OD pair s ∈ S requiring
Qs,t amount of traffic offload at time t. Let N = {1, · · · , N}
be the set of passengers. At each time t, any passenger i ∈
N that participates in traffic offload for any OD pair s ∈ S
receives revenue ri,s,t(qi,s,t) issued by the government, where
qi,s,t ≥ 0 is the amount of traffic offload that passenger i
can provide for OD pair s at time t. Passenger i also incurs
inconvenience cost Ci,s(qi,s,t) if it switches from private to
public transit service due to discomfort and time of arrival
delays. We remark that each passenger is physically located
close to some OD pair s at each time t. Hence each passenger
is only willing to participate in traffic offload for one OD
pair s that is physically close to its current location. For other
OD pairs s′ 6= s, we can regard the associated inconvenience
cost approaches infinity. We assume that the inconvenience
cost function Ci,s(qi,s,t) is continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing with respect to qi,s,t for all s ∈ S, and convex with
Ci,s(0) = 0 for all i and s. The utility of the passenger at
each time step t is given by
Ui,t =
∑
s
[ri,s,t(qi,s,t)− Ci,s(qi,s,t)] . (1)
In this work, we assume the passengers are selfish and rational,
i.e., the passengers selfishly maximize their utilities and never
accept negative utilities.
B. Case 1: Interaction with Two-way Communication
In this subsection, we present the problem formulation under
two-way communication setting. In this case, the interaction
between the government and the set of passengers is captured
by a reverse auction model.
The passengers act as the bidders. Each passenger can sub-
mit a bid bi,t = [bi,1,t, · · · , bi,S,t] to the government at each
time t, where element bi,s,t = (qi,s,t, C¯i,s(qi,s,t)) contains
the amount of traffic offload that passenger i can provide and
the associated inconvenience cost. Note that C¯i,s(qi,s,t) is the
inconvenience cost claimed by passenger i, which does not
necessarily equal the true cost Ci,s(qi,s,t).
The government is the auctioneer. It collects the bids from
all passengers, and then selects a set of passengers that should
participate in traffic offload. In particular, the government
computes a selection profile X ∈ {0, 1}N×S×T , with each
element xi,s,t = 1 if passenger i is selected and 0 otherwise.
If a passenger i is selected by the government for OD pair s,
an associated incentive ri,s,t(qi,s,t) is issued to passenger i.
The utility (1) of each passenger i at time t is rewritten as
Ui,t =
∑
s
xi,s,t [ri,s,t(qi,s,t)− Ci,s(qi,s,t)] , ∀i, t. (2)
The social welfare can be represented as
Ω(X,B) =
∑
t
∑
s
∑
i
[xi,s,t(qi,s,t − Ci,s(qi,s,t))] , (3)
where B contains bi,t for all i and t. The government aims
at maximizing social welfare Ω(X,B). This social welfare
maximization problem is given as
max
X
∑
t
∑
s
∑
i
[xi,s,t(qi,s,t − Ci,s(qi,s,t))] (4a)
s.t.
∑
s∈S
xi,s,t ≤ 1, ∀i, t (4b)∑
i∈N
xi,s,tqi,s,t ≥ Qs,t, ∀s, t (4c)
xi,s,t ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, s, t (4d)
Constraint (4b) implies that a passenger can only be selected
for one OD pair at each time t. Constraint (4c) requires the
desired traffic offload Qs,t must be satisfied for all s and t.
Constraint (4d) defines binary variable xi,s,t.
Under the two-way communication setting, a malicious
adversary aims at inferring the inconvenience cost function
of each passenger by observing the selection profile X . The
adversary can observe X be eavesdropping on communication
channel. Let Xt be the selection profile at time t. Then
the information perceived by the adversary up to time t is
Imalt = {Xt′ |t′ ≤ t}. In this case, the government needs
to compute a privacy preserving incentive mechanism such
that the passengers truthfully report their inconvenience cost
functions so that the social welfare is (approximately) optimal.
Besides the privacy guarantees, we state some additional
desired properties that the government needs to achieve under
this two-way communication setting. First, individual ratio-
nality for each passenger should be guaranteed, i.e., each
passenger must obtain non-negative utility when contributing
to traffic offload. Second, the incentive design is required to
be social welfare maximizing. Third, the government wishes
to reveal the true inconvenience cost functions from the
passengers to seek the optimal solution to (4). Therefore the
government needs to ensure that the passengers bid truthfully.
Truthfulness is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Truthfulness). An auction is truthful if and
only if bidding the true inconvenience cost function, i.e.,
C¯i,s(qi,s,t) = Ci,s(qi,s,t) for all qi,s,t, is the dominant strategy
for any passenger i regardless of the bids from the other
passengers. In other words, bidding C¯i,s(qi,s,t) = Ci,s(qi,s,t)
maximizes the utility (2) of passenger i for all i.
C. Case 2: Interaction with One-way Communication
In this subsection, we present a problem formulation when
two-way communication is infeasible, while one-way com-
munication from the government to the passengers is enabled.
Under this setting, the passengers cannot report any informa-
tion to the government. The government hence broadcasts an
incentive price ps,t for each OD pair s at each time step t, and
then observes the responses from the passengers to design the
incentive price for next time step (t+ 1). Different from two-
way communication, the passengers respond to the incentive
price rather than bidding a fixed amount of traffic offload.
Hence, we define the amount of traffic offload provided by
each passenger i for OD pair s at time t is defined as a
function of incentive price ps,t, and denote it as qi,s(ps,t).
We assume that the the traffic offload qi,s(ps,t) provided by
each passenger i is strictly increasing with respect to ps,t.
The government predicts the traffic condition for the set of
OD pairs S = {1, 2, · · · , S} in the near future time horizon
t = 1, · · · , T based on the historical traffic information (e.g.,
traffic conditions during rush hours). Suppose the government
requires Qs,t ≥ 0 amount of traffic offload on OD pair s at
each time index t. To satisfy Qs,t amount of traffic offload,
the government designs a unit incentive price ps,t for each
time index t to incentivize individual passengers to participate
in the traffic offload program. The information perceived by
the government Igovt up to time t includes the following: (i)
the historical incentives {ps,t′ |t′ = 1, · · · , t − 1, s ∈ S},
(ii) the historical traffic offload offered by the passengers
{qi,s(ps,t′)|i ∈ N , s ∈ S, t′ = 1, · · · , t − 1}. Thus the
government’s decision on ps,t for each time t and OD pair
s can be interpreted as a policy mapping from the information
set to the set of non-negative real numbers ps,t : Igovt 7→ R≥0.
At each time step t, the passengers observe the incentives
ps,t, and then decide whether to participate in traffic offload
and earn the incentive ps,tqi,s(ps,t) based on their own utility
functions. Passengers that participate in traffic offload incur
inconvenience cost Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t)). The inconvenience cost
function Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t)) is private to each passenger i. The in-
formation Iit available to passenger i up to time t includes the
following: (i) the historical incentives {ps,t′ |t′ = 1, · · · , t, s ∈
S}, (ii) the traffic offload function {qi,s(·)|s ∈ S}, and (iii)
its inconvenience cost function {Ci,s(·)|s ∈ S}.
Let pt = [p1,t, · · · , pS,t] be the incentive prices for all OD
pairs s ∈ S at time t. The utility of each passenger i at time
step t can be represented as
Ui,t(pt) =
∑
s∈S
{ps,tqi,s(ps,t)− Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t))} , ∀i, t. (5)
The social cost is given by
Ω(p) =
∑
t
∑
s∈S
{∑
i∈N
Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t))
+ βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(ps,t)
]+}
, (6)
where p = [p1, · · · ,pT ]T contains the incentive prices for
all s and t, [·]+ represents max{·, 0}, and βs represents the
penalty due to deficit of traffic offload. The social cost mini-
mization problem (or equivalently the social cost minimization
problem) is formulated as minp Ω(p).
Under the one-way communication setting, the malicious
party could not observe the participation of each passenger
directly as in two-way communication setting. We focus on a
malicious party that can observe the incentive prices issued by
the government up to time t and then infer the amount of traffic
offload offered by each passenger i, which might be further
used to infer the inconvenience cost functions of the passen-
gers. Denote the information obtained by the government up to
time t as Imalt . Then we have Imalt = {ps,t′ |∀s,∀t′ ≤ t}. The
objective of a malicious party is to compute qi,s(ps,t′) given
Imalt . In this case, the government’s objective is to compute a
privacy preserving incentive design such that the social welfare
is (approximately) maximized.
Besides the privacy guarantee, we briefly discuss the game-
theoretic properties under one-way communication setting.
Since the government broadcasts the incentive price while the
passengers decide if they will participate or not, individual
rationality is automatically guaranteed for rational passengers.
Truthfulness is not required under one-way communication
setting since the passengers cannot send messages to the
government under this setting.
D. Notion of Privacy
In this subsection, we give the notion of privacy adopted in
this paper. We focus on differential privacy [28], [29], which
is defined as follows.
Definition 2. (-Differential Privacy.) Given  ≥ 0, a com-
putation procedure M is said to be -differentially private if
for any two inputs C1 and C2 that differ in a single element
and for any set of outcomes L ⊆ Range(M), the relationship
Pr(M(C1) ∈ L) ≤ exp() · Pr(M(C2) ∈ L) holds, where
Range(M) is the set of all outcomes of M .
Definition 2 requires computation procedure M to behave
similarly given similar inputs, where parameter  models how
similarly the procedure should behave. A more relaxed and
general definition of differential privacy is as follows.
Definition 3. ((, δ)-Differential Privacy.) Given  ≥ 0 and
δ ≥ 0, a computation procedure M is said to be (, δ)-
differentially private if for any two inputs C1 and C2 that
differ in a single element and for any set of outcomes
L ⊆ Range(M), inequality Pr(M(C1) ∈ L) ≤ exp() ·
Pr(M(C2) ∈ L) + δ holds.
To quantify the privacy leakage using the proposed incentive
designs, we adopt the concept of min-entropy leakage [36]. We
first introduce the concepts of min-entropy and conditional
min-entropy [37], and then define the min-entropy leakage.
Let V and Y be random variables. The min-entropy of V is
defined as H∞(V ) = limα→∞ 11−α log2
∑
v Pr(V = v)
α,
where Pr(V = v) represents the probability of V = v.
The conditional min-entropy is defined as H∞(V |Y ) =
− log2
∑
y Pr(Y = y) maxv Pr(v|y), where Pr(v|y) is the
probability that V = v given that Y = y. Then the min-entropy
leakage [36] is defined as L = H∞(V )−H∞(V |Y ).
Under two-way communication setting, the min-entropy
leakage is computed as
L = lim
α→∞
1
1− α log2
∑
B
Pr(B)α−(
− log2
∑
X
Pr(X) max
B
Pr(B|X)
)
,
where Pr(B) is the probability that a bidding profile B
is submitted, and Pr(B|X) is the probability that the bid-
ding profile B is submitted given the selection profile X is
observed. Under one-way communication setting, the min-
entropy leakage is computed as
L = lim
α→∞
1
1− α log2
∑
C
Pr(C)α−(
− log2
∑
p
Pr(p) max
C
Pr(C|p)
)
,
where Pr(C) is the probability that the collection of pas-
sengers’ inconvenience cost functions is C, and Pr(C|p) is
the probability that the collection of inconvenience costs is C
given the historical incentives p is observed.
IV. SOLUTION FOR TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION SETTING
Motivated by exponential mechanism [31], [32], we present
an incentive design for the two-way communication setting
in this section. We propose a payment scheme that achieves
individual rationality. We mitigate the computation complexity
incurred in exponential mechanism using an iterative algo-
rithm. We prove that the desired properties are achieved using
the proposed incentive design.
A. Solution Approach
In this subsection, we give an exact solution under two-way
communication. We formally prove that truthfulness, approx-
imate social welfare maximizing, and differential privacy are
achieved using the proposed mechanism.
The mechanism is presented in Algorithm 1. The algorithm
takes the bid profile from the passengers as input, and gives the
selection profile X and the incentives issued to each selected
passenger. The algorithm works as follows. At each time
t ≤ T , the government selects a feasible solution to social
welfare maximization problem (4). The probability of selecting
each feasible X is proportional to the exponential function
evaluated at the associated social welfare Ω(X,B) with scale

2∆ , where ∆ is the difference between the upper and lower
bound of social welfare Ω(X,B). Although the computation
of selection profile X is motivated by exponential mechanism
[31], [32], the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-like payment
scheme adopted by exponential mechanism is not applicable
to the problem investigated in this work. The reason is that the
VCG-like payment scheme violated individual rationality and
truthfulness in our case, due to the fact that the passengers
do not only have valuations over the incentives, but also
inconvenience costs during traffic offload. To this end, the
payment scheme (8) is proposed for the problem of interest, in
which the incentive issued to each passenger is determined by
the social cost introduced by each passenger. In the following,
we characterize the mechanism presented in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. The mechanism described in Algorithm 1
achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, near optimal so-
cial welfare, and -differential privacy.
Proof. We omit the proof due to space limit. See [35] for a
detailed proof.
The mechanism proposed in Algorithm 1 is computationally
expensive. The payment scheme (8) is intractable when the
passenger set is large since (8) needs to compute the social
welfare associated with X and X−i for all i. Therefore, a
computationally efficient algorithm is desired.
B. Efficient Algorithm
Algorithm 1 is computationally intensive and hence we need
an efficient algorithm. In this subsection, we give a mechanism
that achieves the desired game-theoretic properties and privacy
guarantees and runs in polynomial time.
In real world implementation, since the passengers are
geographically distributed, the government can decompose
the social welfare maximization problem (4) with respect to
OD pair s. Then problem (4) becomes a set of optimization
problems associated with each OD pair s as follows:
max
xs
∑
i∈N
xi,s,t (qi,s − Ci,s(qi,s)) (9)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi,s,tqi,s,t ≥ Qs,t, ∀s, t
xi,s,t ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, s, t.
Given the set of decomposed problems, if we can achieve
the optimal solution to each decomposed problem using an
incentive design, then we reach social optimal solution. Thus
our objective is design a mechanism that achieves the (ap-
proximate) optimal solution of each decomposed problem,
individual rationality, truthfulness, and differential privacy.
Algorithm 1 Mechanism design for the government.
1: procedure MECHANISM(B)
2: Input: Bid profile B
3: Output: Selection profile X , incentives R
4: while t ≤ T do
5: Choose a selection profile X that is feasible for
social welfare maximization problem (4) with probability
Pr(X) ∝ exp
( 
2∆
Ω(X,B)
)
. (7)
6: For each passenger that is selected, issue incentive
ri as
ri,s,t = E
X∼D(bi,t,B−i,t)
{∑
j
∑
s
xj,s,tqj,s,t
−
∑
j′ 6=i
∑
s
xj′,s,tCj′,s(qj′,s,t)
}
+
2∆

E(D(bi,t, B−i,t))
− 2∆

ln
(∑
X
exp
( 
2∆
Ω(X−i, B−i)
))
, (8)
where ∆ is the difference between the upper and lower
bound of social welfare Ω(X,B), E(·) is the Shannon
entropy, D(·) is the probability distribution over selection
profile B, and X−i,t and B−i,t are the matrix obtained by
removing the i-th row and i-th column in selection profile
and bid profile, respectively.
7: t← t+ 1
8: end while
9: end procedure
The proposed efficient algorithm for each decomposed
problem is presented in Algorithm 2. The algorithm itera-
tively computes the set of passengers Ws,t selected by the
government for OD pair s at time t. First, the set Ws,t is
initialized as an empty set. Then at each iteration k, the
probability that selecting a passenger i that has not been
selected at time t is proportional to the exponential function
exp
(
′(qi,s,t − C¯i,s(qi,s,t))
)
, i.e.,
Pr (Ws,t ←Ws,t ∪ {i})
∝
{
exp
(
′(qi,s,t − C¯i,s(qi,s,t))
)
, if i has not been selected;
0 otherwise;
(10)
where ′ = e ln(e/δ) . Then the set of selected passengers Ws,t
are removed from the passenger set N . For each i ∈ Ws,t,
the government issues incentive ri,s,t computed as
ri,s,t = (qi,s,t + z) exp
(
′(qi,s,t − C¯i,s(qi,s,t))
)
−
∫ qi,s,t+z
0
exp(′y)dy, (11)
where z = C¯i,s(qi,s,t)
exp(′(qi,s,t−C¯i,s(qi,s,t))) . We characterize the
solution presented in Algorithm 2 as follows.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 2 achieves truthfulness, individual ra-
tionality, and
(
∆
e(e−1) , δ
)
-differential privacy. Moreover, Algo-
rithm 2 achieves near optimal social welfare Ω∗s − O(lnQs)
with probability at least 1− 1
QsO(1)
, where Ω∗s is the maximum
social welfare for OD pair s.
Proof. We omit the proof due to space limit. See [35] for
detailed proof.
Given Algorithm 2 for each decomposed problem, we
present Algorithm 3, which utilizes Algorithm 2 as subroutine,
to solve for the selection profile X for problem (4). Algorithm
3 works as follows. It first makes S copies of the passenger
set N , with each denoted as Ns for all s ∈ S. Then Algorithm
2 is invoked iteratively to compute the selected passengers for
each OD pair s. The selection profile X for time t is finally
returned as the union ∪sWs,t.
Algorithm 2 Solution algorithm for decomposed problem (9).
1: procedure DECOMPOSE(B)
2: Input: Bid profile B, current time t
3: Output: Selection profile Ws,t
4: Initialization: Selected passenger set Ws,t ← ∅, ′ ←

e ln(e/δ)
5: while |Ws,t| ≤ Qs ∧N 6= ∅ do
6: for i ∈ N do
7: Compute the probability of selecting passenger
i as (10).
8: end for
9: if passenger i is chosen then
10: N ← N \ {i}
11: end if
12: end while
13: return Ws,t
14: end procedure
Algorithm 3 Solution algorithm for problem (4)
1: procedure SOCIAL MAX(B)
2: Input: Bid profile B
3: Output: Selection profile X
4: while t ≤ T do
5: Initialization: Ns = N for all s
6: Remove all passengers that provide negative social
welfare B ← [(qi,s, C¯i,s) : qi,s,t, C¯i,s(qi,s,t) ≥ 0]
7: for s ∈ S do
8: DECOMPOSE(B)
9: Ns = Ns \ ∪s−1s′=1Ws′
10: end for
11: return X = ∪s∈SWs,t
12: t← t+ 1
13: end while
14: end procedure
We conclude this section by characterizing the properties
achieved by Algorithm 3.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 achieves truthfulness, individual
rationality, and
(
∆S
e(e−1) , δS
)
-differential privacy. Moreover,
Algorithm 2 achieves near optimal social welfare Ω∗ −
SO(lnQs) with at least probability 1 − 1Q∗O(1) , where Ω∗
is the maximum social welfare and Q∗ = maxsQs.
Proof. We omit the proof due to space limit. See [35] for
detailed proof.
V. SOLUTION FOR ONE-WAY COMMUNICATION SETTING
In this section, we analyze the problem formulated in
Section III-C. We first present an incentive mechanism de-
sign without privacy guarantee. Then we give the incentive
mechanism design that satisfies differential privacy.
A. Incentive Mechanism Design without Privacy Guarantee
Different from the two-way communication scenario, the
passengers observe the incentive price signal sent by the
government and respond to it by maximizing their own utility.
In the following, we first analyze passengers’ best responses
to price signal. Then we analyze how the government should
design the incentive price to achieve optimal social welfare.
Lemma 2. Given an incentive price ps,t, a selfish and rational
passenger would contribute qi,s(ps,t) =
[
C ′
−1
i,s (qi,s(ps,t))
]+
amount of traffic offload to maximize its utility Ui,t(pt).
Proof. Let s ∈ S be the OD pair that passenger i can
contribute to. Then for any s′ 6= s, we have qi,s′(ps′,t) = 0.
Given an incentive price ps,t, the maximizer of Ui,t(pt) can be
computed as the solution to ps,t = C ′i,s(qi,s(ps,t)) due to the
convexity of Ci,s(·). Therefore, we have that if the incentive
price ps,t is no less than the marginal cost of contributing
C ′i,s(0) for each passenger i, then passenger i participates in
traffic offload. By solving ps,t = C ′i,s(qi,s(ps,t)) for qi,s(ps,t),
we have qi,s(ps,t) =
[
C ′
−1
i,s (ps,t)
]+
, where the operator [·]+
is due to the fact that qi,s(ps,t) ≥ 0, and the existence of the
solution follows by the convexity of Ci,s(·).
We have the following two observations by Lemma 2. First,
a selfish and rational passenger that optimizes its utility will
contribute the amount of traffic offload C ′
−1
i,s (qi,s(ps,t)) if
and only if it can obtain non-negative utility. Moreover, by
observing the participation of each passenger, the government
can infer the gradients of inconvenience cost functions.
Taking the gradient of inconvenience cost function of each
participating passenger C ′
−1
i,s (ps,t) as feedback, the govern-
ment can then use the gradient descent algorithm [38] to
approximately minimize the social cost. In Algorithm 4, the
government first initializes a set of learning rates {η1, · · · , ηT }
that adjusts the step size between two time instants. In the
meanwhile, Algorithm 4 initializes p1 of small value for
time t = 1. Then for each time step t = 2, · · · , T , the
government iteratively updates the incentive price pt+1 as
max
{
ps,t −
∑
i ηtC
′
i,s(q
∗
i,s), 0
}
.
In the following, we characterize Algorithm 4 by analyzing
the social cost incurred using the incentive price returned by
Algorithm 4. Analogous to online convex algorithm [38], we
define the regret of the government. The regret over time
horizon T is defined as
R(T ) = Ω(p)− Ω∗, (12)
Algorithm 4 Computation of incentive price
1: Initialize the sequence of learning rates η1, · · · , ηT−1
2: while t ≤ T do
3: Initialize incentive price p1 > 0 for time step t = 1
arbitrarily
4: Update incentive price as ps,t+1 =
max
{
ps,t −
∑
i ηtC
′
i,s(q
∗
i,s), 0
}
for all s
5: end while
where Ω(p) is the social cost when when selecting a sequence
of incentive prices {ps,t}S,Ts=1,t=1 as defined in (6), and
Ω∗ = min
p
∑
t
∑
s∈S
{∑
i∈N
Ci,s(qi,s(p))
+ βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(p)
]+}
(13)
is the optimal social cost when using a fixed price. Then the
regret (12) models the difference between the social cost when
selecting a sequence of incentive prices {pt}Tt=1 and optimal
social cost from using a fixed price p∗s for each s.
In the following, we characterize the mechanism design
proposed for one-way communication by analyzing the regret
(12). In particular, we analyze the regret (12) by showing that
it satisfies Hannan consistency, i.e.,
lim sup
T→∞
R(T )
T
→ 0. (14)
The Hannan consistency implies that the average regret (14)
vanishes when time horizon approaches infinity. We define
the following notations. Define row vectors gs,t ∈ RN and
hs,t ∈ RN as :
gs,t =
[
C ′1,s(qi,s(ps,t)), · · · , C ′N,s(qi,s(ps,t))
]
(15)
hs,t =
[
q′1,s(ps,t), · · · , q′N,s(ps,t)
]
. (16)
We denote the vectors gs,t and hs,t that are associated
with ps,t = p∗s as g
∗
s,t and h
∗
s,t, respectively. Let g¯ =
maxs,t gs,t(ps,t) and g = mins,t gs,t. Denote the max-
imum incentive price the government would issue as p¯.
We also define column vectors for all s and t as qs,t =
[q1,s(ps,t), · · · , qN,s(ps,t)]T . Similarly, vector q∗s,t represents
the vector associated with ps,t = p∗s . We finally define
ks,t = gs,t ·hs,t+βshs,t1N , where gs,t ·hs,t is the dot product
of gs,t and hs,t. Let k¯ = maxs,t ks,t be the maximum ks,t for
all s and t. Next we show that regret (12) is upper bounded.
Lemma 3. The regret of Algorithm 4 is bounded as
R(T ) ≤
∑
s
{
p¯2ks,T
2ηTgs,T1N
+
T∑
t=1
ηtg¯
2N2ks,t
2gs,t1N
}
. (17)
Proof. The proof is motivated by [38]. Denote the optimal
incentive price associated with optimal social cost Ω∗ as p∗s
for each OD pair s. Due to convexity of inconvenience cost
functions Ci,s(·), for any qi,s(ps,t) and ps,t we have
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t)) + βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(ps,t)
]+
≥
∑
i
{
C ′i,s
(
q∗i,s
) (
qi,s(ps,t)− q∗i,s
)
+ Ci,s(q
∗
i,s)
}
+ βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(ps,t)
]+
.
By definition of gs,t (15), we have that the optimal social cost
satisfies the following inequalities:
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(p
∗
s)) + βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(p
∗
s)
]+
≥ gs,t
(
q∗s,t − qs,t
)
+
∑
i
Ci,s (qi,s(ps,t))
+ βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(p
∗
s)
]+
(18)
≥ gs,t
(
q∗s,t − qs,t
)
+
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t))
+ βs
[
Qs,t − hs,t1N (p∗s − ps,t)−
∑
i
qi,s(ps,t)
]+
(19)
≥ gs,t
(
q∗s,t − qs,t
)
+
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t))
+ βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i
qi,s(ps,t)
]+
− βshs,t1N (p∗s − ps,t),
(20)
where 1N = [1, · · · , 1]T with dimension N , inequality (18)
follows by the convexity of Ci,s(·), inequality (19) follows by
concavity of qi,s(·), and inequality (20) holds by the fact that
[a+b]+ ≥ a+b ≥ [a]+ +b. Rearranging the inequality above,
we have that
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t)) + βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(ps,t)
]+
−
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(p
∗
s))− βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(p
∗
s)
]+
≤ gs,t
(
q∗s,t − qs,t
)
+ βshs,t1N (p
∗
s − ps,t)
≤ gs,t · hs,t(p∗s − ps,t) + βshs,t1N (p∗s − ps,t)
≤ ks,t(p∗s − ps,t),
where ks,t = gs,t · hs,t + βshs,t1N , and gs,t · hs,t represents
the dot product of gs,t and hs,t.
At time step t+ 1, we have
(ps,t+1 − p∗s)2
≤ (ps,t − ηtgs,t1N − p∗s)2 (21)
≤ (ps,t − p∗s)2 − 2ηtgs,t1N (ps,t − p∗s) + η2t g¯2N2, (22)
where inequality (21) holds by the updating rule of ps,t and
inequality (22) holds due to gs,t1N ≤ g¯N . Then we obtain
gs,t1N (p
∗
s − ps,t) ≤
1
2ηt
[
(ps,t − p∗s)2
− (ps,t+1 − p∗s)2 + η2t g¯2N2
]
.
By definition (12), we have
R(T )
= Ω(p)− Ω∗
=
∑
t
∑
s
{∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t)) + βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(ps,t)
]+
−
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(p
∗
s))− βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(p
∗
s)
]+}
≤
∑
t
∑
s
{ks,t(p∗s − ps,t)}
≤
∑
s
{
ks,1
2η1gs,11N
(p∗s − ps,1)2 −
ks,T
2ηTgs,T1N
(p∗s − ps,T+1)2
+
T∑
t=2
(
ks,t
2ηtgs,t1S
− ks,t−1
2ηt−1gs,t−11N
)
(p∗s − ps,t)2
+
T∑
t=1
ηtg¯
2N2ks,t
2gs,t1N
}
≤
∑
s
p¯2
2
{
ks,1
η1gs,11N
+
T∑
t=2
(
ks,t
ηtgs,t1N
− ks,t−1
ηt−1gs,t−11S
)
+
T∑
t=1
ηtg¯
2N2ks,t
2gs,t1N
}
≤
∑
s
{
p¯2ks,T
2ηTgs,T1N
+
T∑
t=1
ηtg¯
2N2ks,t
2gs,t1N
}
,
which completes our proof.
Leveraging Lemma 3, we are ready to show Hannan con-
sistency holds for the proposed incentive mechanism design.
Proposition 1. Let ηt = 1√t . The regret defined in (12) along
with the incentive design proposed in Algorithm 4 achieves
the Hannan consistency.
Proof. The average regret satisfies
R(T )
T
≤
∑
s
{
p¯2ks,T
2ηTgs,T1NT
+
T∑
t=1
ηtg¯
2N2ks,t
2gs,t1NT
}
≤
∑
s
{
p¯2k¯
2ηTNgT
+
T∑
t=1
ηtg¯
2N2k¯
2Ng
}
=
∑
s
{
p¯2k¯
2ηTNgT
+
T∑
t=1
ηtg¯
2Nk¯
2gT
}
,
where the first inequality holds by Lemma 3, the second
inequality holds by the facts that k¯ = maxs,t ks,t and
g¯ = maxs,t gs,t. Moreover, we have
T∑
t=1
ηt =
T∑
t=1
1√
t
≤
∫ T
t=1
1√
t
= 2
√
T − 1.
Thus
lim sup
T→∞
R(T )
T
≤ lim sup
T→∞
{∑
s
(
p¯2k¯
2
√
TNgT
+
g¯2Nk¯
(
2
√
T − 1
)
2gT
)}
,
which approaches zero as T → ∞. Therefore, we have that
the Hannan consistency holds.
B. Incentive Mechanism Design with Privacy Guarantee
In this subsection, we give the differentially private incen-
tive price ps,t under the one-way communication setting.
To achieve the privacy guarantee, we perturb the incentive
price returned by Algorithm 4 as follows:
ps,t = p
∗
s,t + δt, ∀s, t (23)
where δt ∼ L
(
∆p

)
is a random variable that follows
Laplace distribution with scale ∆p/, and ∆p is the maximum
difference of the incentive price under two set of observations
that differ in one passenger, which can be obtained by solving
max
s,t,qs,t,q′s,t
ps,t+1 − p′s,t+1
s.t. ‖qs,t − q′s,t‖1 = 1
where ps,t+1 and p′s,t+1 are incentive prices returned by
Algorithm 4 given traffic offloads qs,t and q′s,t, respectively.
In the sequel, we analyze how privacy is preserved. We start
with analysis for a single time step. Then we generalize our
analysis to multiple time steps.
Lemma 4. Let Igov2 = {qs,2|∀s} ∪ {ps,1|∀s} and Igov
′
2 =
{qs,2|∀s} ∪ {p′s,1|∀s} be the information sets perceived by
the government under the one-way communication setting
that only differ at one element qi,s(ps,1) 6= q′i,s(ps,1). Let
ps,2 = p
′
s,2 be the incentive price issued by the government
for time t = 2 and OD pair s associated with incentive prices
ps,1 and p′s,1, respectively. Let P and P
′ be the probability
density functions of incentive computation given Igov2 and
Igov′2 , respectively. Then the following inequality holds:
P (ps,2)
P ′
(
p′s,2
) ≤ exp((1− η1)).
That is, the proposed incentive design (23) preserves
((1− η1))-differential privacy.
Proof. Since the passengers’ utility function is deterministic,
given an incentive price ps,t, passengers’ participation is
deterministic. Given the initial incentive price ps,1 at t = 1,
the contribution of passenger i is determined as qi,s(ps,1). We
compare the p.d.f.’s at ps,2 = p′s,2.
P (ps,2)
P ′
(
p′s,2
)
=
exp
(
− |ps,1−
∑
j η1C
′
j,s(qj,s(ps,1))−ps,2|
∆p
)
exp
(
− |p
′
s,1−
∑
j η1C
′
j,s(qj,s(p
′
s,1))−ps,2|
∆p
)
= exp
(

(|ps,1 −∑i η1C ′i,s(qi,s(ps,1))− ps,2|)
∆p
− (|p
′
s,1 −
∑
j η1C
′
i,s(qi,s(p
′
s,1))− ps,2|
)
∆p
)
≤ exp
(
− |ps,1 −
∑
j
η1C
′
i,s(qi,s(ps,1))+p′s,1 −∑
j
η1C
′
j,s(qj,s(p
′
s,1))
 |/∆p)
= exp
(

{
|p′s,1 − ps,1 + η1
[
C ′i,s(qi,s(p
′
s,1))
− C ′i,s(qi,s(ps,1))
]|}/∆p)
= exp((1− η1)),
where the inequality follows from triangle inequality, and the
last equality follows by Lemma 2. Thus we have (1 − η1)-
differential privacy.
In the following, we generalize Lemma 4 into multiple time
step scenario.
Theorem 3. Incentive price design (23) achieves((
T −∑T−1t=1 ηt) )-differential privacy.
Proof. We prove by inducting Lemma 4 over multiple time
steps. We note that since the scheme follows Stackelberg
setting, a malicious party can only infer the passengers’
behavior at time t = 1 by observing ps,2. Thus, Lemma 4
serves as our induction base.
At time t, the information perceived by the malicious party
is Imalt = {ps,t′ |∀s, t = 1, · · · , t}. We analyze the ratio
of P (ps,t)
P ′(p′s,t)
under the under the following scenarios. First, if
ps,t′ = p
′
s,t′ for all t
′ < t and ps,t distinguishes from ps,t
as assumed in Lemma 4. Then we have (1 − ηt)-differential
privacy by applying Lemma 4. In the following, we focus on
the general setting in which ps,t′ differs from p′s,t′ for all t
′ < t
such that qs,1:t and q′s,1:t differ at at most one entry. Then we
have
P (ps,t)
P ′
(
p′s,t
)
=
t∏
τ=2
(
Pr (ps,τ |ps,τ−1)
Pr
(
p′s,τ |p′s,τ−1
))
=
t∏
τ=1
{
exp
[

[|ps,τ − p′s,τ + ητ(C ′i,s(qi,s(p′s,τ ))
− C ′i,s(qi,s(ps,τ )
)]|/∆p]}
= exp
((
T −
t∑
τ=1
ητ
)

)
.
Therefore, we have that the proposed approach achieves(
(T −∑T−1t=1 ηt))-differential privacy.
In the remainder of this section, we characterize the social
welfare using the incentive design (23). We start with the
expected regret defined as the probabilistic counter-part of
(12):
E{R(T )} = Ep{Ω(p)} − Ω∗,
where Ep{·} represents expectation with respect to p.
Lemma 5. The expected regret E{R(T )} under incentive (23)
is bounded from above as
E{R(T )} ≤ E
{∑
s
[
p¯2ks,T
2ηTgs,T1N
+
T∑
t=1
ηtg¯
2N2ks,t
2gs,t1N
]}
.
(24)
Proof. The proof is the probabilistic counter-part of that of
Lemma 3.
Before closing this section, we finally show Hannan con-
sistency holds under incentive design (23), i.e.,
lim sup
T→∞
R(T )
T
= 0 with probability one. (25)
Theorem 4. The Hannan consistency (25) holds for incentive
design (23).
To prove Theorem 4, we first give the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let Pr(·) be the probability of an event. Then the
following inequality holds
Pr
(
lim sup
T→∞
{
T∑
t=1
Sk¯max
s
‖p∗s − ps,t‖∞/T
}
≤ 0
)
≥ lim sup
T→∞
Pr
(
T∑
t=1
Sk¯max
s
‖p∗s − ps,t‖∞/T ≤ 0
)
(26)
Proof. Let
V = lim sup
T→∞
T∑
t=1
Sk¯max
s
‖p∗s − ps,t‖∞/T.
Then V can be interpreted as the following two statements for
all for all φ > 0:{
t :
t∑
t′=1
Sk¯max
s
‖p∗s − ps,t′‖∞/t > V + φ
}
is finite{
t :
t∑
t′=1
Sk¯max
s
‖p∗s − ps,t′‖∞/t < V − φ
}
is infinite.
Then by the property of limit superior for sequence of sets,
we have that (26) holds.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 4.) Let k¯ = maxs,t ks,t be the
maximum ks,t for all s and t, and g = mins,t gs,t. Then
following the proof of Lemma 3, we have
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t)) + βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(ps,t)
]+
−
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(p
∗
s))− βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(p
∗
s)
]+
≤ ks,t(p∗s − ps,t)
≤ k¯(p∗s − ps,t).
Summing the inequality above over t and s, we have
Ω(p)− Ω∗
=
∑
t
∑
s
(∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(ps,t)) + βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(ps,t)
]+
−
∑
i
Ci,s(qi,s(p
∗
s))− βs
[
Qs,t −
∑
i∈N
qi,s(p
∗
s)
]+)
≤
∑
t
∑
s
(ks,t(p
∗
s − ps,t))
≤
∑
t
∑
s
(
k¯(p∗s − ps,t)
)
≤
∑
t
∑
s
(
k¯‖p∗s − ps,t‖∞
)
.
Let Pr(·) be the probability of an event. Then we have
Pr
(
lim sup
T→∞
R(T )
T
≤ 0
)
≥ Pr
(
lim sup
T→∞
{∑
t
∑
s
(
k¯‖p∗s − ps,t‖∞
)
/T
}
≤ 0
)
≥ Pr
(
lim sup
T→∞
{∑
t
Sk¯max
s
‖p∗s − ps,t‖∞/T
}
≤ 0
)
≥ lim sup
T→∞
{
Pr
(∑
t
Sk¯maxs ‖p∗s − ps,t‖∞
T
≤ 0
)}
(27)
≥ lim sup
T→∞
{
1− Pr
(∑
t
Sk¯maxs ‖p∗s − ps,t‖∞
T
≥ ∆p

)}
(28)
= lim sup
T→∞
{
1− exp
(
− T
Sk¯
)}
= 1,
where inequality (27) holds by Lemma 6, inequality (28)
holds by (23) and definition of δt. Therefore, we have Hannan
consistency holds.
VI. NUMERICAL CASE STUDY
A. Case Study Setup
We consider a government aiming at initiating traffic offload
for S = 5 OD pairs for the next day. Suppose the time horizon
T = 24 and each time slot t is set as 1 hour. The desired
amount of traffic offload at each OD pair is obtained from
[39]. We use the peak volume traffic data in 2017. The 5 roads
that we used in the data set are county ‘INY’ with direction S,
county ‘LA’ with direction N , county ‘KER’ with direction
W , county ‘FRE’ with direction S, and county ‘IMP’ with
direction S. If a road appears multiple times in the data source,
we take the average over the peak volume as the data used in
the case study. To show the performance of traffic offload, we
use the ahead peak hour traffic volume in [39] as the traffic
volume without traffic offload. Since the ahead hourly traffic
volume data is not available, we treat the ahead traffic data at
different post mile as the traffic volume data at different time.
The size of the passenger set is N = 50000. We assume
the inconvenience cost function Ci,s(qi,s) of each passenger i
is a linear combination of four factors denoted as comfort,
reliability, delay on time of arrival, and cost [25], [26].
Different passenger assigns different weights on these factors.
The weights for each passenger are generated using a multi-
variate normal distribution, with mean [0.16, 0.27, 0.36, 0.21]
and variance 0.3I , where I is identity matrix [26].
B. Two-way Communication
In this section, we demonstrate the proposed approach for
the two-way communication scenario. We first generate the
passengers’ bids. As shown in Theorem 2, the passengers
bid truthfully to the government, and hence the government
knows the inconvenience cost function of each passenger. The
amount of traffic offload that contributed by each passenger
is generated using a normal distribution with mean 3.5 and
variance 0.3. We remark that the contributions model the best
effort of all passengers, i.e., the capabilities of all passengers.
We compute the incentives and selection profile following
Algorithm 3. First, we show the traffic volume on each OD pair
before and after traffic offload in Fig. 1a to Fig. 1e. The solid
curve is the traffic volume before traffic offload, whereas the
dashed curve represents the traffic volume after traffic offload.
As observed in Fig. 1a to Fig. 1e, the traffic volume decreases
by incentivizing the passengers to switch from private to public
transit services. Moreover, the gap between the solid curve
and dashed curve gives the amount of traffic offload due to
passengers switching from private to public transit services.
We next present the social welfare for each OD pair in Fig.
1a to Fig. 1e. We observe that by initiating the traffic offload
program, the government earns non-negative social welfare for
all time t on each OD pair. We finally give the traffic condition
improvement and average payment received by each passenger
for each OD pair at 12 : 00 PM in Table I.
County INY LA FRE KER IMP
Improvement 7.55% 90.15% 0 25.73% 60.67%
Avg. payment $4.164 $3.8572 $0 $3.8683 $3.7047
TABLE I: Traffic volume improvement and average payment
issued to the passengers for each county at 12 : 00 PM under
two-way communication setting.
We present the min-entropy leakage in Fig. 4a to validate
that the proposed incentive design in Algorithm 3 is privacy
preserving. We compute the min-entropy for OD pair ‘INY’
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Fig. 1: In Fig. 1a to Fig. 1e, we present the traffic volume before and after traffic offload. The solid curve is the traffic volume
before traffic offload, whereas the dashed curve represents the traffic volume after traffic offload.
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Fig. 2: In Fig. 2a to Fig. 2e, we present the social welfare at each OD pair.
at 12 : 00 PM when differential privacy parameter  varies
from 0.01 to 1. We observe that the min-entropy is monotone
increasing with respect to parameter , which agrees with our
privacy preserving property. That is, when the mechanism is
designed with stronger privacy guarantee, there exists less min-
entropy leakage for each individual passenger.
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Fig. 3: In Fig. 3a to Fig. 3e, we present the traffic volume before and after traffic offload. The solid curve is the traffic volume
before traffic offload, whereas the dashed curve represents the traffic volume after traffic offload.
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Fig. 4: 4a shows min-entropy leakage for OD pair INY at
12 : 00 PM when parameter  varies from 0.01 to 1. Fig. 4b
shows Min-entropy leakage L for OD pair INY over time.
C. One-way Communication
In this subsection, we demonstrate the proposed approach
for the one-way communication scenario. The government
initializes a first guess of incentive price 0.02$. Given the
incentive price ps,t, the response from each passenger is
computed by Lemma 2. The capability of each passenger is
adopted from the setting under two-way communication.
We present the traffic volume on each OD pair before
and after traffic offload in Fig. 3a to Fig. 3e. We have the
following observations. First, the traffic volume decreases
due to passengers switching from private to public transit
services. Similar to Fig. 1a to Fig. 1e, the gap between the
curves represents the amount of traffic offload. Finally, the
traffic volume after traffic offload is lower than that under
two-way communication setting for some time t, i.e., the
amount of traffic offload contributed by the passengers is
higher than that under two-way communication setting. The
reasons are two fold. First, the government does not know the
inconvenience cost function of each passenger under the one-
way communication setting and has no ability to select the par-
ticipating passengers. Therefore, the participating passengers
could contribute more than Qs,t for all s and t under one-way
communication setting. However, the government selects the
winners under two-way communication setting and only Qs,t
amount of traffic offload is realized for all s and t. Second,
the passengers’ inconvenience costs are modeled as linear
function. Hence any passenger i such that ps,t ≥ C ′i,s(qi,s)
would participate in traffic offload by shedding the maximum
amount of traffic offload, i.e., contribute its maximum effort.
We finally present the min-entropy leakage for OD pair
(INY) under one-way communication setting in Fig. 4b. In
this case study, parameter  is set as 0.015. We show how
privacy is preserved over time. We observe that the privacy
leakage increases over time. The reason is that the malicious
party perceives more information over time. Hence, more
information can be inferred by the adversary as time increases.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the problem of incentivizing
passengers to switch from private to public transit service
to mitigate traffic congestion and achieve sustainability. We
consider two settings denoted as two-way communication
and one-way communication. We model the interaction under
former setting using a reverse auction model and propose
a polynomial time algorithm to solve for an approximate
solution that achieves approximate social optimal, truthfulness,
individual rationality, and differential privacy. In the latter
setting, we present a convex program to solve for the incentive
price. The proposed approach achieves Hannan consistency
and differential privacy. The proposed approaches are evalu-
ated using a numerical case study with real-world trace data.
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